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SOME THOUGHTS ABOUT JUDICIAL REFORM

DONALD H. HUNTER*
HE TOPIC

of judicial reform is most timely in light of recent

events. Many people are questioning the fundamental framework of our Republic; old traditions and loyalties, long cherished
ideals, and institutions of government are being challenged and shaken
by strong hands of militant dissent. In and out of court our judicial
system is subjected to ridicule and mockery-not only by radical elements bent upon destruction, but also by persons in high places and
erstwhile law-abiding citizens whose disobedience of court orders
is a phenomenon all too prevalent. Often such disobedience and
disrespect is practiced by those who have the most to lose from a
general deterioration of law and order; their irresponsible conduct
invites bitter response, further polarization of attitudes and possible
censure from their fellow citizens. The end result is subjection of
the judiciary to pressures that would belie its existence as a separate,
co-equal branch of government. The decisions which the courts of
this land are now making, and will be required to make in the near
future, dictate that the men upon whom the responsibility lies be eminently qualified for the task. Whether our current selection processes
afford a system which guarantees that such men will, in fact, be
sitting on the bench is questionable. I believe it is time for the bench
and bar to re-examine, seriously, the questions of qualification, selection, tenure and retention of judges. Illinois, as well as Indiana,
has taken the first step, as witnessed by their respective proposals for
constitutional revision of their judicial departments. Other states, and
indeed the federal system, have not been as diligent.
In most instances, state judges are selected by means of the partisan political process-with all the risks and insecurities attendant to
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such a process. Federal judges, on the other hand, are appointed,
and enjoy a tenure for life or "good behavior." Both systems have
desirable attributes, yet each evolved as a result of circumstances
existing at various times in our history.
The manner in which federal judges gain access to the bench is
quite apparently the result of the customs and attitudes prevailing
prior to and immediately following the revolution. The English custom was for the king to appoint colonial judges, their salaries and
term of office being subject to his absolute discretion. Royal coercion
was not unfamiliar, and "justice" often had overtones of royal expediency. The Declaration of Independence, in fact, listed judicial
abuses as one of the colonists' primary complaints against George
III. One should note, however, that the framers of the Declaration
did not regard appointment as undesirable, but were concerned only
with the lack of secure tenure and salary.1 What they were really
concerned with was an independent judiciary. These concerns surfaced in the Constitutional Convention and were allayed by the provisions of our Constitution, which placed appointive powers in the
hands of the President, subject, of course, to the advice and consent
of the Senate.2 Tenure and salary were safeguarded.3 It was
thought that such a method would correct the abuses mentioned in
the Declaration of Independence.
Second thoughts were had by Thomas Jefferson, one of the major
architects of those provisions, after the case of Marbury v. Madison4 had demonstrated the risks, at least in the mind of Jefferson, of
making the judiciary too "independent." However, the original constitutional provisions relating to our federal judiciary have remained
substantially unchanged since their adoption.
The influences which were largely responsible for the method by
which the majority of states eventually came to select their judges
were of a different nature. The tremendous growth of the Western
frontier, coupled with the election of Andrew Jackson as President
1. "He has made judges dependent on his will alone, for the tenure of their
offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries."
2. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, states: "[H]e [the President] shall nominate
and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint . . .Judges
of the Supreme Court."

3. See U.S. CONsT. art.
4.

m, § 1.

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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in 1828, resulted in a political philosophy now referred to as Jacksonian Democracy.5 Crucial to this philosophy was an absolute
belief in the ability of the "common man" to participate in, and
actually administer, the affairs of state.6 Initiated primarily as an
attack on aristocraticcontrol of the government, this philosophy gradually led to the advocacy of universal elections for all public officials,
including judges.
The Jacksonians believed that American judges were invested with
legislative functions. In many states there was little statutory law,
almost no local precedent, and the common law was regarded with a
great deal of suspicion. In the eyes of some, the courts were beginning to act and legislate according to the common law, without
responsibility to any controlling authority. So strong was this feeling
that New Jersey and Kentucky actually passed statutes prohibiting
the citation of common law authority. The end result was a popular
clamor for judges to be placed under the direct control of the electorate. The rationalization for such a system was the belief that the
elected judges were more likely to adjudicate disputes according to
the popular will and opinion of the people.
The adoption of the elective method did not occur because of a
failure of the appointive method. Each was essentially the product
of circumstances and passions existing at the time. Both systems represent the preservation of a basic philosophy relating to courts, which,
however, should now be combined in a universal reform of this nation's court systems. The federal system sanctifies an independent
judiciary with lengthy tenures. But those state systems utilizing the
elective method have recognized that the judiciary should not be so
independent as to deprive the populace of some method by which
the judiciary can be made responsive to the will of the people.
With this in mind, let us quickly review the most prevalent criticisms of both systems. Most are well aware of the faults inherent in
the elective process. The courts are susceptible to political pressures,
the corollary of which is that the citizenry lose respect for what they
consider to be politically motivated judges. Tenure is often unreasonably short and subject to partisan frivolity at election time.
5.
6.

See HOFSTADTER,
Id. at 55-56.

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION

45-67 (1948).
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Who cannot recall the name of a qualified judge who has been defeated by issues involving, not himself, but those running on the
same political ticket? Further, the elective process discourages many
qualified attorneys from seeking judgeships because of their distaste
for the political arena. Is the risk of political abuse equalized by the
honor of serving on the bench? Many say no. Often the result is
a bench composed of individuals whose talents and interests lie in
areas other than in the field of legal scholarship and judicial acumen.
Different, yet equally substantial criticisms have been leveled at
the federal appointive system as it currently operates under the
Constitution. Many would question the advisability of life tenure and
all it represents. Further, the mode of removal provided by the
Constitution is totally unsatisfactory. The drastic and far-reaching
consequences of impeachment, with all it connotes, does nothing to
enhance the image of the judiciary. Surely a less traumatic means of
removal might be devised.
Coupled with the problem of life tenure is one which has become
increasingly apparent over recent years, during which numerous decisions have been handed down affecting each and every citizen.
The problem is that of philosophical rigidity-rigid because the members of the court, although entitled to their respective viewpoints, are
allowed to remain on the bench, unchecked, for life. Certainly one
does not subject himself to impeachment merely for articulating unpopular viewpoints in a written opinion. There is no breach of judicial ethics, and "good behavior" is not a question. However, allowing such a person to remain on the bench indefinitely without affording the citizenry some mode of effectively expressing approval or
disapproval would seem to run counter to our basic democratic philosophy of government by the people. An independent judiciary
does not, I believe, necessarily require that it be answerable to no
man. To argue otherwise is to endorse an "aristocracy of the robe"! 7
Others would focus on the manner by which federal court judges
are selected. Need I point out those instances known to each of us
where political considerations were apparently paramount? Surely
a more professional screening and selective process could be implemented where the executive's authority to appoint might be checked
7.

(1898).

BURGESS,

POLITICAL SCIENCE AND COMPARATIVE

CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW

365
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by an independent screening commission.
Having reviewed what I consider to be the basic disadvantages of
both systems, I would like to outline briefly what I consider to be an
appropriate manner by which to select judges on both the state and
federal level. The features of this plan closely approximate the proposal now pending voter approval in Indiana and are embodied in
the proposed judicial article of Illinois.
First, appointment would be made by the executive officer, President or Governor, but only from those nominations submitted by an
independent, non-partisan screening body. The appointee would
then serve for an interim period (two years in Indiana), after which
the electorate is asked, on a non-partisan ballot, to indicate their approval or disapproval of the nominee's judicial performance. Upon
initial approval by the electorate, the "approved judge" then serves
for an extended term (ten years in Indiana) on the bench. At the
close of each term of office, the judge is again placed on a non-partisan ballot to determine voter approval.
It should be apparent that this very basic proposal goes far to meet
the objections heretofore noted to both of the present systems. The independent commission narrowly confines the choices available to the
executive officer, hopefully eliminating, at least in a large measure,
political considerations. Appointees are spared the travails of the
political gauntlet. The court's independence from pressures, political or otherwise, is assured while at the same time the people are afforded a voice in the court's ultimate composition. Tenure is lengthened, when compared to the present elective systems, yet it is not
absolute. A method of removal is afforded, less drastic than impeachmznt yet no less effective. Finally, the citizenry need not feel
helplessly bound by a legal philosophy imposed and preserved by a
judicial body over which they have no control. The end result can
only be to enhance the stature and prestige of the judiciary in the
eyes of the public.
The approach described would be particularly apropos as a
method of selecting and retaining the Justices of the United States
Supreme Court. I believe very strongly that a change in the manner
of selecticn and retention of our nation's highest judges would not
only contribute directly to the cause of judicial reform, but would
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also go a long way toward restoring respect and confidence in all
the courts of this land.
Although the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution has been in force for over one hundred years, it has been only
within the last ten years that the United States Supreme Court has begun its system of "incorporation," whereby most of the first ten federal amendments, together with accompanying federal standards,
have been enforced against the states. Most of these decisions have
been rendered by a one judge majority of that Court, a fact which
not only points out the absence of unanimity in this new approach,
but also dramatizes the extraordinary power concentrated in five
justices of that Court. The "Bevy of platonic guardians"" referred
to by Justice Learned Hand might well be amended to "a quintet of
platonic guardians."
The judicial soundness of the controversial line of Supreme Court
cases such as Miranda v. Arizona,' United States v. Wade,"0 and
Chimel v. California," is not at issue here-what is important is
the far-reaching effects of these decisions. I would dare suggest
that when the United States Supreme Court decides a case and sets
"minimal" standards therein, it frequently contributes to the overall
lessening of the judicial flexibility exercisable by the courts of the
fifty states of this nation. The recent trend in this direction is apparent and somewhat disconcerting. When one considers that these
landmark decisions have been decided by a majority of five men on
the Court, and when one further considers the far-reaching impact
of these decisions, it seems illogical that these justices serve for life
terms unchecked, in a practical sense, by either the citizenry at large
or by another co-equal branch of government. The importance of
adopting methods of selection and removal, when viewed in light of
the expanding power of the United States Supreme Court, assumes
compelling proportions. I submit that reposing so much power, essentially unchecked for life, in so few men is at odds with the foundation upon which this country was founded, that is: government by
the people. It is this unchecked concentration of power which
HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73 (1958).
9. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
10. Wade v. California, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
11. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
8.
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breeds frustration among the American people and often renders
judicial innovation on the state level much more difficult. The
ideological controversy surrounding the attempted appointments of
Judges Haynsworth and Carswell by President Nixon represents, in
my opinion, one of the unfortunate consequences of the present
method of selection and removal of Supreme Court justices. The
President's unsuccessful attempts to seat a "strict constructionist" on
the Court were merely a reflection of the frustration of that substantial body of the American public aware of their inability to render the
Court's members more responsive to their view of the United States
Constitution in these rapidly changing times. To be sure, it is not
the Court's function to interpret the Constitution the way the majority of the American people would like it to be interpreted, but
there is certainly something to be said for enabling the citizenry to
change the composition of the Court at regular intervals as a means
of exercising a check on its judicial performance. Much of the
criticism of the Supreme Court would be greatly attenuated were
the people of this nation able to pass at regular intervals on the
conduct of the Court. There is little doubt that most of the Court's
recent decisions would remain unchanged irrespective of any changes
in its membership. However, the mere presence of a procedure for
changing the composition of the Court less drastic than impeachment
is necessary if the power of the Court is to be effectively controlled.
More important, such a change would encourage greater respect for
our courts by giving to the people the satisfaction of knowing that no
institution of their government is beyond their effective reach. The
tremendous and far-reaching social consequences flowing from decisions which become "the law of the land" should cause us to reconsider the present system under which the Court operates.
Such a situation is typified by the 1896 case of Plessy v. Ferguson, 12 in which the United States Supreme Court held that separate but equal facilities for black and white Americans were constitutionally permissible. It took fifty-eight years for the Court to
reverse itself by its opinion in Brown v. Board of Education.1 3 It
might be well to consider the ever-present possibility that any one of
the Court's more recent decisions could have the same adverse impact
12.

Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).

13.

Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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years from now that Plessy had in our recent past. I submit that
under the present scheme of selection and life tenure, the Supreme
Court's decisions are, for all intents and purposes, unassailable-for
so long a period of time that irreparable social consequences could
and do result in the interim. A growing number of our citizens from
all walks of life are questioning whether this nation can any longer
afford the great time lag between necessity for change and its actual
accomplishment.
I suppose that the tenor of this article sounds a bit like some of
the recent dissents written by Justice Hugo Black, in which he evidences a fundamental distaste for the assumption of power by a small
number of men at the expense of the fifty judicial systems of the states
of the Union. Although this may or may not be the case, I believe it
to be secondary to the precise question with which this paper is concerned: judicial reform must take place throughout the legal system
in its entirety, and not be confined merely to one or a few states.
People who choose to disrespect our legal system will do so without
regard to geographic boundaries or jurisdictional niceties. We
could reform our state courts to a high level of perfection, but if the
federal system, particularly the United States Supreme Court, remains inflexible or unresponsive, our goals will never be achieved.
Clearly, there is a need for judicial balance and mutual respect among
the various judicial systems of this nation. It would be asking too
much to expect our people to have respect for our courts if we had
none.
I firmly believe that instituting procedures similar to those outlined above in the federal system, with particular emphasis on the
United States Supreme Court, would go far toward restoring the
respect and confidence in the law among the citizens of this country. Such reform is essential.
It would be folly for us to argue that our judicial institutions are
being challenged only by the radical elements in our society. The
truth of the matter is that the group known as the "Silent Majority"
in America has begun to join in the chorus of those who are questioning the efficacy of our legal system. It is a truism that if fealty
and respect for the judicial system is in the process of erosion, then
the concept of "government of laws" is at a very precarious state
in our history.
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Respect for our judicial system and its functions must be a constant force in our constitutional republic if it is to survive. Judicial
reform is essential to accomplish that respect.

